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UNITED STATES V. ATLANTIC RESEARCH
CORP.: WHO SHOULD PAY TO CLEAN UP
INACTIVE HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES?
AARON GERSHONOWITZ†
It has been almost thirty years since Congress passed the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act1 (CERCLA, Superfund, or the Superfund Law), and the
Supreme Court is now engaged in a major reexamination of the basics
of Superfund liability. This reexamination began with Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.(Aviall),2 in which the Supreme
Court held that a potentially responsible party at a Superfund site
who voluntarily cleaned up the site did not have a contribution claim
against the person who caused the contamination.3 This decision
surprised most experts because encouraging remediation and
requiring those who caused the contamination to pay for the cleanup
were among the major underpinnings of Superfund liability.4 The
decision also created a significant amount of confusion regarding the

† Partner, Forchelli, Curto, Schwartz, Mineo, Carlino & Cohn LLP, Mineola, New York.
Adjunct Faculty, University of Phoenix Online Campus. Louisa Chan, a J.D. candidate at St.
John’s University School of Law, assisted in the preparation of this article.
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 to 9657
(2000)).
2. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
3. See infra notes 32–48 and accompanying text. Aviall was responding to a demand by a
regulatory agency and was a “volunteer” only in the sense that it was not acting pursuant to a
written agreement with a regulatory agency or in response to litigation. Id.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733–34 (8th Cir. 1986)
(discussing the legislative history and concluding that Congress intended to impose the cost on
“those parties who created and profited from the sites”); United States v. Ottati Goss, Inc., 630
F. Supp. 1361, 1398–99 (D.N.H. 1985) (observing that the retroactive nature of CERCLA belies
Congress’ intent to make responsible parties pay cleanup costs); United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 221–22 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (discussing CERCLA’s imposition of
liability on responsible parties), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 113(f)(1) (2000), as
recognized in Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Keith M.
Lyons, Jr., Comment, Everyone Pays to Clean Up America: A Discussion of CERCLA Section
107(a)(3) and the Term “Arranged for Disposal”, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 589, 596–98 (1992)
(discussing the goals of CERCLA and its legislative history).
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relationship between Superfund’s contribution provision (§ 113)5 and
its primary liability provision (§ 107).6
Federal courts quickly developed a number of responses to the
Aviall decision, and within three years there was a split in the federal
circuits regarding whether, in light of Aviall, § 107(a) should be
interpreted to provide a cause of action for claims by potentially
responsible parties who voluntarily remediate Superfund sites.7 In
8
United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. (Atlantic Research), the
Supreme Court resolved the split in the circuits and approved the
volunteer’s right to bring a cost recovery action against a person who
caused the contamination.
This article will analyze the Atlantic Research decision and argue
that, while on its face the Atlantic Research decision appears to
correct the problems created by Aviall, Atlantic Research is really a
logical consequence of Aviall, and together the two decisions suggest
a fundamental change in how liability at inactive hazardous waste
sites should be addressed. This article will then examine the likely
consequences of that change in direction.
I. BACKGROUND
Congress passed the Superfund Law to address the problem of
9
“chemical poisons” in the environment. The Resource Conservation
10
and Recovery Act (RCRA), passed by Congress in 1976, regulated
the generation and disposal of hazardous wastes. It did not, however,
address liability for hazardous wastes that were released or disposed
of prior to the passage of RCRA. These “inactive” hazardous waste
sites were seen as a major public health risk, and Congress created a
liability scheme for the remediation of these sites with the Superfund
Law.11

5. 42 U.S.C. § 9613.
6. Id. § 9607.
7. See Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, 473 F.3d 824,
829–37 (7th Cir. 2007) (allowing recovery for potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under § 107
and discussing the circuit split); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515,
531–43 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting PRP’s right of recovery under § 107); Consol. Edison Co. v.
UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2005) (allowing PRP to recover).
8. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).
9. See Robert T. Stafford, Why Superfund Was Needed, EPA J., June 1981, available at
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/cercla/04.htm.
10. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90
Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992K (2000)).
11. For a discussion of the history of Superfund and the reasons for its passage, see ALAN
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A. Section 107(a)
Section 107(a), the primary Superfund liability provision, begins
by listing four parties who may be held liable: (1) the current owner
or operator of the facility; (2) the owner or operator of the facility at
the time of the disposal of hazardous substances; (3) a person who
arranged for disposal of hazardous substances “owned or possessed
by such person;”12 and (4) a person who transported waste to the
facility, if that person chose the facility.13 These four parties are
commonly referred to as potentially responsible parties, or PRPs.
Courts have interpreted § 107(a) broadly in accordance with two
main policy goals: (1) to facilitate prompt cleanup of inactive
hazardous waste sites, and (2) to impose liability for the costs of
cleanup on those who contributed to the presence of the waste.14
In addition to listing the liable parties, § 107(a) defines what
costs these parties may be liable for, and to whom. Section
107(a)(4)(A) provides that the above listed parties “shall be liable for
all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State.” Section 107(a)(4)(B) provides that the same
parties shall be liable for “any other necessary costs of response
incurred by any other person.” Because “response” is defined in the
15
statute to include “remove, removal, remedy and remedial action,”
the “costs of response” that a private party can recover under §

J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1:1 (2008–2009 ed.). See
also H.R. REP. NO. 1016(II), at 5 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6120, 6153.
12. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
13. The text of § 9607(a) defines who may be liable under CERCLA:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses
set forth in subsection (b) of this section—
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable . . . .
Id. § 9607(a)(1)–(4).
14. TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 11, § 1:1 n.16 (citing numerous cases).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (“The terms ‘respond’ or ‘response’ mean remove, removal,
remedy, and remedial action.”).
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107(a)(4)(B) are the same as the “costs of removal or remedial
action” the government can recover under § 107(a)(4)(A).
Courts have interpreted § 107(a) to provide for strict joint and
several liability.16 This can create particularly harsh results.17 For
example, one party can be required to fund the entire remediation of
a site even though that party contributed only a small portion of the
waste at the site, and a person who purchased a contaminated site
without knowledge of the contamination can be required to
remediate the site even though the purchaser did not contribute to
the contamination.
The Superfund Law as originally passed did not address the issue
of suits between liable parties. Nevertheless, most courts held that
one liable party could bring a claim against other liable parties.18
Recognizing such a claim, which some saw as a contribution claim,
relieved some of the unfairness of imposing strict joint and several
liability on one party or a small group of parties when others may also
have § 107(a) liability at the same site.
B. SARA and § 113
In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act (commonly referred to as SARA).19 SARA
included the explicit contribution provisions contained in § 113.
Section 113(f)(1) provides that “[a]ny person may seek contribution
from any other person who is liable or potentially liable . . . during or
20
following any civil action.” Section 113(f)(3) provides a separate

16. See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 11, § 4:11. The authors summed up a section on joint
and several liability by stating that “in a very short period of time, so many courts had adopted
the Chem-Dyne position [holding that Superfund defendants are jointly and severally liable]
that there was no longer a reasonable basis for disagreement concerning the application of joint
and several liability.” Id.; see also United States v. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 n.7
(2007) (“We assume without deciding that § 107(a) provides for joint and several liability.”).
17. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178–79 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that joint and
several liability “often result[s] in defendants paying for more than their share”); United States
v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 629 n.15 (D.N.H 1988) (stating that the right of contribution is
necessary to reduce the “harsh results” that can be associated with joint and several liability).
18. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 648 F. Supp. 255, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(allowing a third party complaint to go forward); United States v. New Castle County, 642 F.
Supp. 1258, 1269 (D. Del. 1986) (discussing private party suits and the right to contribution),
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 113(f)(1) (2000), as recognized in Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI
Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2005).
19. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
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right of contribution for persons who have resolved their liability to
the government.21 The legislative history of § 113 indicates that
Congress was confirming the existence of the right of contribution,
22
not necessarily adding a new right of contribution.
After SARA added § 113, many courts held that a contribution
23
claim could not be brought under § 107(a). Additionally, because a
defendant in an action pursuant to § 107(a) is subject to joint and
several liability, and a claim between responsible parties was
necessarily a claim for apportionment of liability like a contribution
claim, most courts held that liable parties could not bring actions
pursuant to § 107(a), or if they could, such claims would be treated as
claims for contribution, not cost recovery.24
The relationship between a private party’s § 107(a) claim and
such party’s § 113 contribution claim was addressed by the Supreme
25
Court in dicta in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States. In Key Tronic, a
private party brought a § 107(a)(4)(B) cost recovery action against
another responsible party. The issue before the court was whether
attorneys’ fees were within the definition of “response costs,”26 and
the Court noted that after SARA, “the statute now expressly
authorizes a cause of action for contribution in § 113 and impliedly
authorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping remedy in § 107.”27
To understand how §§ 107 and 113 relate to each other, one
needs to understand the relationship between §§ 107(a)(4)(A) and
107(a)(4)(B). The simplest way to view the relationship between §§
107(a)(4)(A) and 107(a)(4)(B) is that subsection (A) is for

21. Id. § 9613(f)(3).
22. See S. REP. NO. 99-11, at 44 (1985), reprinted in 3 SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1993); see also 131 CONG. REC.
S11998-01 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1985) (statements of Sen. Stafford).
23. See United States v. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2334 (2007) (stating that after
SARA, “many Courts of Appeals held that § 113(f) was the exclusive remedy for PRPs”). The
Court said this was based on the need to “direct traffic” between § 107(a) and § 113. Id.
(quoting Atl. Research v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2006)).
24. See, e.g., Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1998) (distinguishing
between joint tortfeasors and innocent parties); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
118 F.3d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1997) (characterizing the action as one of contribution), overruled
by Kotrous v. Goss-Jewett Co., 523 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing a conflict with
Atlantic Research).
25. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
26. Id. at 814–15 (noting that attorneys’ fees are generally not recoverable, but that
CERCLA includes costs of enforcement in the definition of response costs).
27. Id. at 816.
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governmental suits for response costs and subsection (B) is for suits
for response costs by other parties.28
A second view of how the two subsections relate to each other
focused on who the nongovernmental plaintiff may be. On its face,
“any other person” seems very broad, and prior to SARA, PRPs were
permitted to bring § 107(a)(4)(B) actions against other PRPs. After
SARA, with the addition of the contribution provisions of § 113,
courts “direct[ing] traffic between” §§ 107 and 113 reinterpreted §
107(a)(4)(B), concluding that “any other party” was limited to parties
who were not potentially responsible parties.29
Where did this limitation come from? Courts read the phrase
“incurred by any other person” to mean “incurred by persons other
than potentially responsible parties” by reading § 107(a) as one long
sentence, the subject of which is the list of potentially responsible
parties. Section 107(a)(1)–(4) states that PRPs “shall be liable for –”
and the “for” is followed by two relevant clauses—“(A) all costs of
removal or remedial action incurred by the Government[,]” and “(B)
any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person.”
The “other person,” in this understanding of subsection B means
other than the people listed in (a)(1)–(4), meaning other than a
potentially responsible party.30
This reading is consistent with the way most courts understood §
107(a) prior to Aviall. That is, before Aviall, most courts held that §
113 was the sole remedy for a PRP and § 107(a) provided a remedy
for the government and for others who were neither the government
nor PRPs.31 This conclusion was based in part on fear that if PRPs
could use § 107(a), then § 113 would be superfluous. The Aviall Court
created a situation in which there could be a §107(a) PRP versus PRP
claim without rendering § 113 superfluous.
C. The Aviall Decision
The Aviall Court held that a volunteer could not bring a §
113(f)(1) contribution claim because the claim was not “during or

28. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2334–35 (noting that this was the common reading of the
provisions prior to the enactment of SARA).
29. See id. at 2334; see also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 169
(2004) (stating that “the parties cite numerous decisions of the Courts of Appeals as holding
that a private party that is itself a PRP may not pursue a § 107(a) action against other PRPs”).
30. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2335–37.
31. See id. at 2334; see also Aviall, 543 U.S. at 169.
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following” a civil action.32 Aviall had purchased contaminated sites
from Cooper Industries and operated the sites for several years
33
Aviall notified the State
before discovering the contamination.
regulatory agency, and the State threatened to initiate an
enforcement action against Aviall if Aviall did not remediate the
sites.34 Aviall remediated the sites and initiated a contribution action
against Cooper Industries, alleging that Cooper Industries was
responsible for all or part of the remedial costs.35
The Aviall case presented the Court with a conflict between the
language of CERCLA and the policies underlying it. Section
113(f)(1) provides a contribution action “during or following” a civil
action.36 The language “during or following” appears to exclude
contribution prior to a civil action.37 Thus, the language of the statute,
38
on its face, favored dismissal of the volunteer’s suit. On the other
hand, the policies underlying Superfund—to encourage cleanup of
hazardous sites and to require those responsible for creating the sites
to pay the costs of cleanup—argued that a volunteer should have a
right of contribution and that the party who had caused the
contamination should not be able to avoid liability.39
On a deeper level, the issue was less how to read § 113(f)(1) than
how to read the Superfund Law in its totality. Prior to SARA, which
added § 113, most courts read § 107(a) to include an implied right for
PRPs to bring suit against other PRPs.40 Once there was an explicit

32. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 165–66 (emphasizing that Aviall’s failure to satisfy the “during or
following” condition precluded it from seeking contribution under § 113(f)(1)).
33. Id. at 163–64.
34. Id. at 164.
35. See id. (indicating that Aviall originally asserted a cost recovery claim under CERCLA
§ 107(a) and a separate claim for contribution under § 113(f)(1) before amending the
complaint).
36. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000).
37. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 508 F.3d 126, 134–35 (3d Cir.
2007), abrogated by United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2335 (2007).
38. See Aviall, 543 U.S. at 165–66.
39. See supra notes 4 and 11 and accompanying text; see also Eve L. Pouliot, Coercion vs.
Cooperation: Suggestions for the Better Effectuation of CERCLA (Superfund), 47 SMU L. REV.
607, 618 (1994) (reiterating the problem of CERCLA’s contribution provision(s) in practical
effect).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171–72 (4th Cir. 1988); Wickland
Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 889, 891–92 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding the private
party claim under § 107(a)); Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317–18 (6th Cir. 1985)
(upholding the private party claim under § 107(a)); United States v. New Castle County, 642 F.
Supp. 1258, 1267–69 (D. Del. 1986) (noting that new § 113(f) ratifies the existing caselaw that
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right of contribution, however, courts reinterpreted § 107(a) to
exclude PRP suits because no statute should be read to contain two
41
provisions that perform the same function.
Based on this, Aviall argued that a broad reading of the right of
contribution was consistent with the way other provisions of
CERCLA were being interpreted and a narrow reading of § 113(f)
could have a ripple effect, requiring a reexamination of other
42
For example, a reinterpretation of § 113 to limit
provisions.
contribution could suggest a reexamination of § 107(a) because there
would no longer be two provisions providing the same function.43
Additionally, most courts have concluded that defendants in § 107(a)
actions are subject to joint and several liability, but a PRP should not
be able to collect all of its costs.44 Thus, a reexamination of whether a
PRP can bring a § 107(a) action may require a reexamination of
45
whether all § 107(a) defendants face joint and several liability. If a
PRP can collect all of its costs pursuant to § 107(a) and only an
equitable share of costs pursuant to § 113, why would a PRP ever
choose to bring a § 113 action? These questions permitted Aviall to
argue that holding that Aviall does not have a right of contribution

permits private parties to bring contribution actions under § 107(a)), superseded by statute, 42
U.S.C. § 113(f)(1), as recognized in Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir.
2005); Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1489–91 (D. Colo. 1985) (a potentially
responsible party may bring a contribution action under § 107(a)); United States v. S.C.
Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 994–95 (D.S.C. 1984) (discussing the right of
contribution), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 176; City of
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142–43 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (stating that a
responsible party may bring a § 107(a) action against another responsible party).
41. See, e.g., Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423–24 (2d Cir. 1998); Centerior Serv.
Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 349–56 (6th Cir. 1998); Pneumo Abex
Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 776 (4th Cir. 1998); Pinal Creek
Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301–06 (9th Cir. 1997); Redwing Carriers,
Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 n.7 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Colo. & E.
R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535–36 (10th Cir. 1995); United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33
F.3d 96, 101–03 (1st Cir. 1994); Azko Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir.
1994).
42. Brief of Respondent at 20–22, Aviall, 543 U.S. 157 (No. 02-1192), 2004 WL 768554.
43. See Aviall, 543 U.S. at 159.
44. E.g., United Techs., 33 F.3d at 100; see also Renee M. Collier & Timothy J. Evans,
Department of Defense Affirmative Cost Recovery Against Private Third Parties, 58 A.F. L. REV.
125, 134–35 (2006) (noting that courts have refused to allow a PRP to recover all response costs
based on its status as a joint tortfeasor and not as an innocent party).
45. See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2338 (2007) (distinguishing
when a PRP can bring a § 113(f) contribution claim as opposed to a § 107(a) claim to recover
response costs).
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could disrupt the Superfund status quo and could lead to other
significant changes in Superfund liability.
The Court’s decision in Aviall recognized the conflict between
the language and the policy, and concluded that the Court must
interpret the statute as written—§ 113(f) provides for contribution
claims “during or following” a civil action, but not for a volunteer.46
The Court also recognized the potential “ripple” effect on other parts
47
of the Superfund Law and expressed no opinion on the issue that
would be addressed in Atlantic Research.48
II. THE ATLANTIC RESEARCH DECISION
Atlantic Research voluntarily remediated a site at which it was a
potentially responsible party as an operator, and brought a claim
against the U.S. Government, the owner of the site.49 After the Aviall
decision prevented its § 113 claim from going forward, Atlantic
50
Research amended its complaint to allege a § 107(a) claim. The
United States moved to dismiss, arguing that § 107(a) does not allow
claims by PRPs.51 The District Court dismissed the action and the
52
53
54
Eighth Circuit reversed, joining the Second and Seventh Circuits
in finding that a PRP who did not have a contribution claim because
of Aviall had a cause of action under § 107(a). The Third Circuit had
taken the opposite view in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United
States.55
The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that a PRP acting as a
56
volunteer can incur costs that are recoverable under § 107(a)(4)(B).
The Court’s reasoning was based largely on an analysis of §§
107(a)(4)(A) and (a)(4)(B) of the statute and the conclusion that to
read the statute any other way would render subsection (a)(4)(B)

46. See Aviall, 543 U.S. at 165–68.
47. Id. at 169–70.
48. See id. (stating that it was “prudent to withhold judgment” on that issue because it had
not been briefed).
49. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2335.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 827 (8th Cir. 2006).
53. Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005).
54. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, 473 F.3d 824 (7th
Cir. 2007).
55. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 543 (3d Cir. 2006).
56. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338.
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meaningless.57 Once the court concluded that PRPs could bring
actions under both §§ 107(a) and 113(f)(1), the Court needed to
explain how the various liability sections of Superfund fit together
and what role each plays.58
A. The Relationship Between §§ 107 and 113
The Court began its analysis by noting that the Superfund Law
contains two main liability provisions: (1) § 107(a), which permits
claims to recover remedial costs; and (2) § 113, which permits claims
for contribution.59 The pre-Aviall law assigned a role to each,
providing that PRPs could only bring § 113 actions and non-PRPs
60
could bring § 107(a) actions. The flaw in that arrangement, the
Court explained, was that § 107(a) really contains two distinct liability
provisions, and each needs to have a role.61 While § 107(a)(4)(A)
explicitly authorizes actions by the United States or a State, §
62
If §
107(a)(4)(B) authorizes suits “by any other person.”
107(a)(4)(B) did not include PRP claims, the Court explained, then
63
the phrase “by any other person” would be rendered meaningless
because everyone who can make a claim for response costs is either
the U.S. or a State government (a § 107 (a)(4)(A) plaintiff) or a PRP
(a § 113 plaintiff).64 Therefore, the Court needed to find a role for §
107(a)(4)(B).65
The government had argued, as many pre-Aviall courts had held,
that § 107(a)(4)(B) was intended to provide a claim for “innocent”
parties who are not government entities, and did not provide a claim
66
for non-innocent PRPs. The Court rejected that argument because §
107(a) defines PRP “so broadly as to sweep in virtually all persons
likely to incur cleanup costs.”67 Moreover, the “by any other person”

57. Id. at 2336–37.
58. Id. at 2338.
59. Id. at 2337.
60. Id. at 2337–38.
61. Id. at 2336.
62. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)–(B) (2000).
63. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2336–37.
64. Id. at 2335–37.
65. See id. at 2338 n.6.
66. Id. at 2336–37.
67. Id. at 2336.
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language of § 107(a)(4)(B) does not support a distinction between
private parties based on whether they are PRPs and non-PRPs.68
After holding that § 107(a)(4)(B) provides a cause of action for
PRPs, the Court needed to address when a PRP may bring a § 107(a)
claim and when it may (or must) bring a § 113 claim.69 Or, put
another way, if private parties can proceed under § 107(a), why do we
need § 113?
The Court answered this question by explaining that the two
sections serve distinct purposes.70 Section 107(a)(4)(B) permits the
recovery of “necessary costs of response incurred by any other
71
The prerequisite to an action under this provision is
person.”
incurring response costs,72 which the Court said limits § 107(a) to
73
claims for costs “‘incurred’ in cleaning up the site.” The Court
explained that “when a party pays to satisfy a settlement agreement,
it does not incur its own costs of response.”74 Thus, a § 107(a) action
is available to a volunteer who has incurred response costs (i.e., has
cleaned up the property), but not to one who has “paid to satisfy a
settlement agreement or a court judgment” because the party who
“reimburses other parties for costs” has not incurred its own response
costs.75
Section 113 contribution, on the other hand, is the “tortfeasor’s
right to collect from others responsible for the same tort after the
76
tortfeasor has paid more than his or her proportionate share.” A
prerequisite to a contribution action is “inequitable distribution of
77
common liability,” which cannot occur without a finding of liability.
Therefore, § 113 is available only to the person who has been a
defendant in litigation or has otherwise reimbursed someone for
response costs.78
The Court recognized that the dividing line it was drawing
between § 107(a)(4)(B) and § 113(f) claims was far from clear, and
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2337–38.
70. Id. at 2337.
71. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000).
72. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338.
73. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2338 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (8th ed. 1999)).
77. Id.
78. See id.
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stated in a footnote that “[w]e do not suggest that §§ 107(a)(4)(B)
and 113(f) have no overlap at all.”79 Specifically, the Court noted that
a PRP could incur expenses “following a suit” that are neither
80
voluntary nor reimbursement of the costs of another party. The
Court did not express an opinion regarding “whether these compelled
81
costs of response are recoverable under § 113(f), § 107(a) or both.”
The Court cited United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris
Industries, Inc.82 as a case which illustrates the potential overlap.
B. United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc.
An analysis of the United Technologies case will provide a better
understanding of the distinction drawn by the Court in Atlantic
Research because the First Circuit’s opinion in United Technologies
rejected this distinction after a thorough analysis, and the Atlantic
Research Court responded point by point to the arguments made in
United Technologies. United Technologies settled an Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) cost recovery action by agreeing to
reimburse EPA for costs EPA had incurred and by agreeing to
83
perform remediation. It then brought an action against BrowningFerris, asserting claims under both §§ 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f).84
Defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging that the claims
were barred by the three-year statute of limitations for contribution
claims.85 United Technologies argued that the claim was not time
barred because it was instituted within the six-year limitations period
86
The court, thus, needed to determine
for cost recovery claims.
whether the claim was a cost recovery claim under § 107(a)(4)(B) or a
87
contribution claim under § 113(f).
The court began its analysis by noting that § 113(g)(2) provides a
six-year limitations period for § 107(a) cost recovery actions while §
113(g)(3) provides a three-year limitations period for § 113
contribution claims, demonstrating Congress’ intent that §§

79. Id. at 2338 n.6.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994).
83. Id. at 97.
84. Id. at 97–98.
85. Id. at 98. The defendants argued that the federal claims were time barred, and that
upon finding this, the court would lack jurisdiction over the state claims. Id.
86. See id. at 101.
87. See id. at 98.
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107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) create distinct causes of action.88 If they are
distinct causes of action, the court reasoned, they must arise in
different circumstances. The court rejected the idea that a plaintiff
could proceed under both sections as “untenable,”89 because if a
plaintiff could proceed under both sections, no one would choose §
113, and that would “completely swallow section [113(g)(3)’s] threeyear statute of limitations.”90
United Technologies argued that the dividing line between the
two provisions was similar to the dividing line later described by the
91
Court in Atlantic Research. It argued that § 107(a)(4)(B) was for the
recovery of what it termed “first instance” costs, meaning costs
92
Section 113(f) would then be
incurred in remediating the site.
limited to the costs of reimbursing someone else for money spent
93
The First Circuit rejected this distinction,
remediating the site.
reasoning that such a distinction would unreasonably limit the scope
of the phrase “any other necessary costs” in § 107(a)(4)(B).94 The
court explained that such a distinction would treat the phrase “any
other necessary costs” as if it stated “any other necessary costs . . .
except for monies paid to reimburse government entities’ cleanup
95
costs,” and that there is “simply no rhyme or reason for reading that
condition into what appears on its face to be a straightforward
statutory directive.”96
The First Circuit made two additional arguments against the
distinction between “first instance” costs and reimbursement costs.
First, the distinction relies on “an unusually cramped reading of the
term contribution.”97 Second, the distinction would “emasculate[] the
contribution protection element of CERCLA’s settlement
98
framework.”
The court explained that the traditional meaning of contribution
is a right of “one who has discharged a common liability to recover of
88. Id.
89. Id. at 101.
90. Id.
91. See id.; see also United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2338 (2007).
92. United Techs., 33 F.3d at 101.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 102 (quoting Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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another also liable, the aliquot portion.”99 The court explained that
regardless of whether a party has remediated a site at which several
parties are liable or reimbursed the government for its remediation,
such person has discharged a common duty and is seeking to recover
the aliquot portion.100 The court further noted that the legislative
history of SARA indicates Congress’ intent to apply the common law
101
Thus, treating “contribution” as
definition of contribution.
something that occurs only to reimburse someone after litigation
limits the term more than Congress intended.
The First Circuit’s reasoning regarding contribution protection is
based on § 113(f)(2), which provides that one who settles with the
government “shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding
102
This provision encourages
matters addressed in the settlement.”
settlement by allowing one to settle and buy total peace because no
other party could sue the settler for contribution claiming the settler
had not paid its fair share.103 The ability to buy contribution
protection, however, is not worth much if other responsible parties
104
can bring a § 107(a)(4)(B) cost recovery action after settlement.
Thus, the First Circuit concluded that allowing § 107(a) claims by
PRPs would defeat the purpose of the contribution protection
provision of SARA.105
Based on the above, the First Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s
arguments that the difference between §§ 107(a)(4)(B) and 113
centers on the subject matter of the claims (i.e., whether the plaintiff
is seeking to recover remediation costs it incurred or sums that it paid
to reimburse another party), and concluded that the essential
difference is in the identity of the plaintiff—§ 113(f) is for PRPs and §
106
107(a)(4)(B) is for persons who are not PRPs.

99. Id. at 99 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 399 (6th ed. 1990)).
100. Id. at 101.
101. Id. at 100.
102. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
103. See United Techs., 33 F.3d at 103.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 101–02.
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C. The Atlantic Research Court’s Response to United Technologies
The Supreme Court in Atlantic Research rejected the distinction
suggested by the First Circuit in United Technologies and responded
to each element of the First Circuit’s reasoning.
1. § 107(a) Will Swallow Up § 113(f)
In United Technologies the First Circuit concluded that a PRP
could not bring a § 107(a) action because if a PRP could, then no one
would ever bring a claim under §113(f).107 The reason no one would
bring a § 113(f) claim is that § 107(a) has both substantive and
procedural advantages.108 Most courts impose joint and several
109
Section 113, on the other hand, only
liability under § 107(a).
permits recovery of the defendant’s fair share.110 The different
statutes of limitations also provide a reason for a plaintiff to choose §
111
107(a). Note that in United Technologies, the plaintiff needed the
longer limitations period applicable to § 107(a) claims.112
The Atlantic Research Court addressed this issue by creating a
dividing line between § 107(a) and § 113(f) claims that means that
very few plaintiffs will have the opportunity to allege a cause of action
113
under both sections. The Court noted that because costs incurred
voluntarily will be recoverable only under § 107(a)(4)(B), and costs of
reimbursement of another person pursuant to a judgment or
settlement will be recoverable only under § 113(f), “neither remedy
swallows the other.”114

107. Id. at 103.
108. See Hope Whitney, Cities and Superfund: Encouraging Brownfield Development, 30
ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 74 (2003) (stating the purported advantages of § 107 to recover costs).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 502 F.3d 781, 794 (9th Cir.
2007); Chem-Nuclear Sys. v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254, 259–60 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v.
Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twp. of Brighton, 153 F.3d
307, 317 (6th Cir. 1998); Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Sequa Corp. (In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc.), 3
F.3d 889, 895–96 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan-PAS), 990
F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan-Butler), 964 F.2d
252, 269 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
110. See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2338 (2007).
111. See United Techs., 33 F.3d at 98 (noting the six-year statute of limitations for cost
recovery actions and the three-year statute of limitations for contribution claims).
112. See id. at 103.
113. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338 (demonstrating instances where a PRP may
recover under § 113(f)(1), but not under § 107(a)).
114. Id. at 2338 n.6.
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The Court also explained that the advantages of using § 107(a)
may not be so significant because a PRP may not be able to avoid the
equitable distribution among PRPs required by § 113(f) by choosing
to impose joint and several liability under § 107(a). Even for those
who may have a cause of action under both sections, a defendant in a
§ 107(a) action could reduce the inequity of joint and several liability
by counterclaiming for contribution.115 Whether this reduces the
inequitable distribution or eliminates it needs to be examined. The
Court cited Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utilities, Inc.
(Con Ed)116 as listing cases in which the plaintiff and defendant had
brought both § 107(a) and § 113(f) claims and counterclaims.117 It is
possible that in such a case, a court would be required to make an
118
equitable allocation.
2. Any Other Costs
The First Circuit, in United Technologies, concluded that limiting
§ 107(a)(4)(B) to claims by persons who have incurred “first
instance” cleanup costs limits the phrase “any other costs” without
any language in the statute to suggest such a limitation.119 The
Atlantic Research Court’s response to this argument is that the statute
120
does contain this limitation. The complete phrase in the statute is
“any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
121
person.” The Atlantic Research Court stated that § 107(a) “permits
a PRP to recover only the costs it has incurred in cleaning up a
site . . . . When a party pays to satisfy a settlement agreement or a
court judgment, it does not incur its own costs of response.”122 Thus, §
107(a)(4)(B) is limited to claims by persons who have remediated the
site (“first instance” claims) because only these parties have
“incurred” response costs.123

115. Id. at 2339.
116. Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005).
117. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2339; see also Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 100 n.9 (citing
Blasland, Bouck & Lee v. City of N. Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2002)); Dent v.
Beazer Materials & Servs., 156 F.3d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 1998); Redwing Carriers v. Saraland
Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1495 (11th Cir. 1996)).
118. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2339.
119. See United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 102 (1st Cir. 1994).
120. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338.
121. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
122. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338 (emphasis added).
123. Id.
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This limitation is slightly different from the limitation suggested
by the Second Circuit in Con Ed.124 The Second Circuit reached
essentially the same conclusion as Atlantic Research, that a person
125
who has not paid for the cleanup has not incurred response costs.
However, unlike the Atlantic Research Court, which concluded that
such persons have not “incurred” the costs (they have merely
reimbursed the person who incurred them),126 the Con Ed court
suggested that such persons have not incurred “necessary costs of
127
The court cited United States v. Taylor128 for the
response.”
proposition that “when a party ‘does not conduct its own cleanup, it
has not incurred recovery costs[,]’”129 noting that the reimbursement
130
costs incurred by Taylor were “not costs of response.”
By focusing on who incurred the response costs rather than
whether the costs were costs of response, the Atlantic Research Court
131
limited the impact of the case. The term “response costs” has long
been viewed as including many costs that were not strictly speaking
132
cleanup costs. In Key Tronic, for example, the issue was whether
certain litigation costs were “response costs” and the Court held that
fees incurred in searching for additional PRPs were response costs,
but certain attorneys’ fees were not.133 The emphasis on who has
incurred the recoverable costs avoids redefining “response costs.”
3. Definition of Contribution
The United Technologies court rejected the distinction between
“first instance” costs (which do not give rise to contribution claims)
and costs of reimbursement (which are the subject of contribution
claims) because such a distinction relies on “an unusually cramped
reading” of the term contribution.134 The Atlantic Research Court
disagreed. The crux of the disagreement regarding the meaning of
“contribution” concerns whether a judgment against the person

124. Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005).
125. See id. at 100.
126. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338.
127. Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 101.
128. United States v. Taylor, 909 F. Supp. 355 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
129. Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 101 (quoting Taylor, 909 F. Supp. at 365).
130. Id. at 101 n.13.
131. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338.
132. See, e.g., Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989)
(suggesting that recovery under CERCLA is not limited to cleanup costs).
133. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 811, 820 (1994).
134. United Techs. Corp. v. Browing-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 102 (1st Cir. 1994).

Gershonowitz__final.doc

136

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

3/4/2009 3:08:29 PM

[Vol. 19:119

claiming contribution is a prerequisite to a contribution claim.135 Both
courts agreed that contribution is a common law doctrine aimed at
preventing or reducing the unfairness inherent in joint and several
liability.136 It is a claim between jointly and severally liable parties for
“an appropriate division of the payment one of them has been
137
Both courts also agreed that in passing
compelled to make.”
CERCLA, Congress intended terms such as “contribution,” that have
a common law meaning, to include that evolving common law
meaning.138 Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ discussion of
contribution is relevant to interpreting the term contribution in
CERCLA.139
The Atlantic Research Court disagreed with the United
Technologies court regarding whether potentially responsible parties
are joint tortfeasors. Joint tortfeasors are subject to joint and several
liability.140 A potentially responsible party who is a § 107(a)(4)(B)
plaintiff may not be subject to joint and several liability.141 More
importantly, the Atlantic Research Court cited Aviall for the
proposition that §§ 107(a) and 113(f) are “clearly distinct”
remedies.142 If they are distinct remedies, then treating all actions
between PRPs (which necessarily require apportionment among

135. Compare Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338, with United Techs., 33 F.3d at 102.
136. See Alan S. Ritchie, Note, The Proposed “Securities Private Enforcement Reform Act”:
The Introduction of Proportionate Liability Into Rule 10b-5 Litigation, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339,
360 (1994) (emphasizing the policy objective of fairness behind the doctrine of contribution).
137. United Techs., 33 F.3d at 99 (quoting Azko Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761,
764 (7th Cir. 1994)).
138. See Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, Environmental Affairs in
Bankruptcy: 2004, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 331, 352 n.96 (2004) (discussing the way the
common law sense of “contribution” was modified by Congress).
139. See H. French Brown, IV, Rebirth of CERCLA § 107 Contribution Actions: New Life
for PRPs That Conduct Voluntary Cleanups after Aviall, 14 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 211, 218 (2007)
(noting that many courts found the Restatement (Second) of Torts to govern actions where
PRPs incurred more than their fair share of cleanup costs).
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF HARM TO CAUSES §
433A.
141. If they are entitled to joint and several liability as the Court implied, then they cannot
be subject to more than a contribution claim. See William D. Auxer, Comment, Orphan Shares:
Should They Be Borne Solely by Settling PRP Conducting the Remedial Cleanup or Should They
Be Allocated Among All Viable PRPs Relative to Their Equitable Share of CERCLA Liability?,
16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 267, 267 (1997–1998) (stating that defendant PRPs were
responsible for all cleanup costs incurred by a plaintiff PRP under the theory of joint and
several liability).
142. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2337 (2007).
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PRPs) as contribution claims “confuses the complementary yet
distinct nature of the rights”143 provided by the sections.
If the rights and remedies are distinct, then the difference
between a § 107(a)(4)(B) plaintiff and a § 113(f) plaintiff is not
merely procedural. The Eighth Circuit, in Atlantic Research Corp. v.
United States, had concluded that the only difference between a §
107(a)(4)(B) plaintiff and a § 113(f) plaintiff is the parties’ “different
procedural circumstances.”144 What the court meant is that the rights
and remedies were essentially the same. The only difference is that
the person who had been sued could only bring a § 113(f) claim, while
those who had not been sued could bring a § 107(a) claim (but not a §
113(f) claim).145
The Atlantic Research Court disagreed with that conclusion
146
because the two provisions provide distinct rights and remedies.
147
The § 107(a)(4)(B) plaintiff has incurred response costs.
The §
148
113(f) plaintiff has not incurred response costs. The statute treats
those who have incurred response costs differently (as a matter of
substantive rights) than the person who has not incurred response
costs and has merely reimbursed someone else for costs.149 Such a
person is entitled to joint and several liability and has a longer statute
of limitations. Thus, the conclusion that not all claims between PRPs
are contribution claims is based on the conclusion that not all PRPs
are joint tortfeasors.150 The § 107(a)(4)(B) plaintiff is a joint
tortfeasor with the other PRPs only after there has been a judgment
or settlement. Thus, the Atlantic Research Court concluded that a
determination of liability is a requirement to a contribution claim.
This may explain why the Con Ed court refused to use the term
PRP. While courts and practitioners have used the term PRP for

143. Id.
144. Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 835 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Consol.
Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 2005)).
145. See id. at 836–37 (explaining the vitality of §§ 107 and 113 as available remedies).
146. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2337.
147. See id. at 2338; see also Lewis A. Fleak, Case Note, Contribution to Inaction:
Interpreting CERCLA to Encourage, Rather than Discourage, Hazardous Waste Clean-Up, 11
MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 294, 300 (2004) (affirming that § 107(a) refers to persons who
incurred cleanup costs).
148. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338.
149. Id.
150. See Michael V. Hernandez, Cost Recovery or Contribution?: Resolving the Controversy
Over CERCLA Claims Brought by Potentially Responsible Parties, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
83, 130 (1997) (pointing out that not all claims by PRPs are for contribution).
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many years, the Second Circuit took the position that after Aviall, it
may not be appropriate to use the term PRP because it “may be read
to confer on a party that has not been held liable a legal status that it
should not bear.”151 The Second Circuit’s point was that even though
two parties may, if sued, have Superfund liability, the “volunteer”
who sues under § 107(a)(4)(B) has a different legal status from other
PRPs and it may be confusing to use the same designation.152
4. Contribution Protection
The United Technologies court refused to permit PRPs to bring
actions under § 107(a)(4)(B) in part because that would interfere with
the contribution protection provided in § 113(f)(2).153 The court’s
reasoning was that the government’s ability to promote settlements
154
by offering contribution protection was an important part of SARA.
Contribution protection means protection against contribution claims
and not protection against cost recovery claims.155 Thus, recognizing a
cost recovery claim for PRPs means the government cannot protect
the settling parties against all future suits, which will, in turn, hinder
the ability of the government to settle cases.156
The Atlantic Research Court provided three responses to this
problem. First, because a § 107(a)(4)(B) defendant can trigger
apportionment by bringing a § 113(f) counterclaim and a court of
equity will always take prior settlements into account, there is little
risk to the settling party that a court will require it to pay more than
its equitable share.157 Second, contribution protection “continues to
provide significant protection”158—it protects against all contribution
claims and very few parties (i.e., only those who performed the
159
Third,
cleanup) will have the ability to bring a § 107 claim.
“settlement carries the inherent benefit of finally resolving liability as
to the United States or a State.”160 Thus, the Court believed that even

151. See Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 97 n.8 (2d Cir. 2005).
152. See id. at 100 n.9 (recognizing that voluntary cleanup may depend on how § 107(a) is
read).
153. See United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 101–03 (1st Cir. 1994).
154. Id. at 102.
155. Id. at 103.
156. See id. at 102–03 (suggesting that the CERCLA settlement framework would be
undermined if a cost recovery claim is recognized).
157. See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 (2007).
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. Id.
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though contribution protection would no longer provide absolute
protection, it will provide enough protection to continue to encourage
161
settlement.
III. THE NEW CERCLA FRAMEWORK
Pre-Aviall: (1) § 107(a)(4)(B) was only for suits by nongovernment parties who were not PRPs;162 (2) all PRPs were viewed
as joint tortfeasors so that a PRP who performed remediation was not
treated significantly differently from a PRP who reimbursed someone
else for performing remediation;163 (3) all PRP versus PRP claims
164
165
were § 113 claims, which are subject to equitable apportionment;
and (4) the EPA, in a settlement, could provide protection against all
future claims arising out of the site.166 Now, each of those statements
is either not true or subject to significant question.
A. Performing Remediation Versus Reimbursing
Chief among the changes made by the Court in Atlantic
Research, and the catalyst for some of the other changes, is the
167
distinction between performing remediation and reimbursing others.
Section 107 is only available to the person who has performed
168
remediation because only that person has “incurred” response costs.
Why did the Court read this distinction into the statute when most
prior courts had not?

161. See id. (“[P]ermitting PRPs to seek recovery under § 107(a) will not eviscerate the
settlement bar set forth in § 113(f)(2).”).
162. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 99–106, 119–23 and accompanying text; see also Hernandez, supra note
150, at 105–06 (noting that the two types of PRPs—remediation and reimbursement—were not
treated differently).
164. See supra notes 66–78 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., United Techs. Corp. v.
Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that a claim of liable parties
“must be classified as an action for contribution”).
165. See Ronald G. Aronovsky, Federalism and CERCLA: Rethinking the Role of Federal
Law in Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 29 (2006) (“[A] claim by one PRP
against another PRP necessarily is for contribution.”).
166. See supra notes 153–61 and accompanying text; see also Craig N. Johnston, United
States v. Atlantic Research Corp.: The Supreme Court Restores Voluntary Cleanups Under
CERCLA, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 313, 325 (2007) (“[T]he settlement bar continues to provide
significant protection from contribution suits by PRPs.” (quoting Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at
2339)).
167. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338.
168. Id.
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The Court rejected the pre-Aviall reading of § 107(a)(4)(B) for
two reasons. First, courts had read into § 107(a)(4)(B) a distinction
between PRPs and others that cannot be found in the language of the
statute.169 Second, by distinguishing between PRPs and others who
were not PRPs, courts had interpreted § 107(a)(4)(B) in a manner
170
that rendered it useless.
The Court, however, went beyond simply reasoning that §
107(a)(4)(B) needs to be reinterpreted because the meaning that
prior courts attributed to it rendered it useless. The Court made the
affirmative decision that just as the simple meaning of the section
rejects the distinction made by so many earlier courts, the simple
meaning of the section requires the distinction it was drawing—
section 107(a)(4)(B) provides a cause of action only for persons who
have “incurred response costs,” and not for persons who have
171
reimbursed others for response costs.
The Con Ed court read the section similarly, interpreting §
107(a)(4)(B) as applying only to those who “incurred response costs,”
172
not to those who reimburse others. The Con Ed decision, however,
had a slightly different emphasis and this difference goes to the heart
of understanding the distinction between the § 107(a)(4)(B) plaintiff
and the person who merely reimbursed others. According to the Con
Ed court, the difference between the remediator and the reimburser
is whether the costs they incurred were “response costs,”173 while the
Atlantic Research Court concluded that the difference is who has
174
“incurred” the response costs. The position taken by the Atlantic
Research Court maintained the broad definition of “response costs”
used by prior courts, and thus maintained an expansive reading of
what the § 107(a)(4)(B) plaintiff may recover once we decide who
may be a § 107(a)(4)(B) plaintiff.175
169. See id. at 2336 (dismissing the interpretation of § 107(a)(4)(B) as distinguishing
between PRPs and non-PRPs); see also Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 99–100
(2d Cir. 2005); United Techs., 33 F.3d at 100.
170. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2337 (stating that acceptance of the distinction between
PRPs and non-PRPs would render § 107(a)(4)(B) useless because there are no non-PRPs which
would incur response costs); Brown, supra note 139, at 232–33 (referencing cases that found no
basis for the distinction).
171. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2334, 2338.
172. See Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 100 (“Section 107(a) makes its cost recovery remedy
available . . . to any person that has incurred necessary costs of response . . . .”).
173. See id. at 96 n.6 (discussing the meaning of “response” as used in the statute).
174. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338 (“[Section] 107(a) permits cost recovery (as distinct
from contribution) by a private party that has itself incurred cleanup costs” (emphasis added)).
175. See id.
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The difference between Con Ed and Atlantic Research in this
regard is subtle. When asked who may recover under § 107(a)(4)(B)
and what costs may they recover, the Con Ed court answered: (1) any
other party, but (2) only for response costs (which excludes
reimbursement costs).176 On the other hand, the Atlantic Research
Court answered: (1) only persons who incurred response costs (which
excludes persons who reimbursed someone who incurred response
costs), and (2) they can recover response costs (which retains the
177
original meaning of the phrase response costs).
For the reasons described below, the Atlantic Research Court’s
reading of § 107(a)(4)(B) is more consistent with other CERCLA
provisions, shows a better understanding of the practical reality
regarding who is a “volunteer,” and helps explain how the Court
would respond when faced with the overlap case that it left open.
B. The Overlap
In Atlantic Research, the Court noted that the line between the
volunteer remediator who has a § 107(a)(4)(B) claim and the
reimburser who has only a § 113 contribution claim is not so clear and
there could be an overlap—a person who has performed remediation
and therefore should have a § 107(a)(4)(B) claim, but who is not a
178
volunteer and therefore has a § 113 contribution claim. The Court
179
declined to decide how such overlap cases should be treated.
The Court’s reasoning suggests that the remediator who is not a
volunteer should have a cause of action under both provisions.
Nothing in the Court’s interpretation of § 107(a) indicates that only
volunteers may have a § 107 cause of action; the key is incurring
180
Indeed, nothing in § 107 or in the Court’s
response costs.
interpretation of § 107 indicates that being a volunteer is relevant.181
The language does, however, limit recovery under § 107 to “costs of

176. See Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 99 (“The only questions we must answer are whether
Con Ed is a ‘person’ and whether it has incurred ‘costs of response.’”).
177. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338.
178. Id. at 2338 n.6.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 2338 (noting that a PRP may be compelled pursuant to a consent decree,
which may give rise to a § 113(f) or § 107(a) claim, or both).
181. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000); see also Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338 (noting that
“costs incurred voluntarily are recoverable only by way of § 107(a)(4)(B),” but disclaiming that
voluntary action is necessary).
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response incurred by any other person.”182 Thus, in the overlap case,
the plaintiff should have a § 107 claim for the money spent cleaning
up the property. The plaintiff should also have a § 113 contribution
claim for the money spent reimbursing someone else because the
litigation that prevents him from being a volunteer triggers a
contribution claim. For example, if one settled litigation by agreeing
to spend $100,000 on remediation costs and reimbursing the
government $500,000 for its costs, the plaintiff should have a § 107
cause of action for the $100,000 and only a contribution claim for the
$500,000.
The Court’s reasoning so strongly suggests that the overlap
plaintiff should have both causes of action that we need to examine
why the Court declined to decide this issue. One reason for declining
to decide is that the Court’s holding was that a volunteer who
183
remediates has a § 107(a) claim. The Court was not faced with the
case in which the plaintiff who remediated was not a volunteer, and
184
that issue had not been briefed.
A second reason could be the Court’s recognition that in
reinterpreting § 107(a)(4)(B), the Court was responding to an issue
created by the Aviall decision, which held that a volunteer did not
185
Whether one was a volunteer or a
have a § 113(f)(1) claim.
defendant in a civil action is key to determining who has a § 113(f)(1)
186
claim. Thus, there is some ground to suggest that being a volunteer
was important in determining who has a § 107(a) claim.187 Whether
being a volunteer is important in interpreting § 107(a)(4)(B) is
addressed below in section C.
Another reason for the Court not deciding this issue relates to
the contribution counterclaim and the joint and several liability issues

182. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
183. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338 n.6.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2334 (noting that the Aviall decision had “caused several Courts of Appeals to
reconsider whether PRPs have rights under § 107(a)(4)(B)”).
186. The holding in Aviall was that, in order to have a § 113(f)(1) claim, one must have been
a defendant in a § 106 or § 107 action. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157,
160–61 (2004); see also Jeannette Paull, Neither Innocent nor Proven Guilty: The Aviall Services
v. Cooper Industries Dilemma, 13 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 48 (2005) (recognizing the dilemma
between those that can and cannot sue under § 113(f)(1)).
187. See Stanley A. Millan, Contemporary CERCLA: Reversals of Fortune and Black Holes,
16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 183, 214 (2005) (discussing the application of § 107 on volunteer
cleanup participants).
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raised by that counterclaim. The joint and several liability issue is
discussed below in section D.
C. Volunteer Versus Forced Remediator
The difference between the way the Atlantic Research Court and
the Con Ed court read the phrase “costs of response incurred by any
188
other person,” shows how the courts differed on the issue of
whether being a volunteer is important. According to the Atlantic
Research Court, the person who has a § 107(a)(4)(B) claim is the
person who performed remediation, because only the person who has
performed remediation has “incurred” response costs.189 The Court’s
reasoning does not suggest that whether this person was a volunteer
has any relevance to whether the person has incurred response costs.
The Con Ed court, on the other hand, explained that its
understanding of the term “response costs” is based in part on
whether the person spending the money is responding to the release
190
of hazardous substances or to a claim. If a person is a volunteer, he
or she is responding to the release of hazardous substances.191 That
person has, therefore, incurred response costs.192 On the other hand, a
person who merely reimburses someone else due to litigation or
threat of litigation has only a contribution claim because that person
is responding to the litigation or threat of litigation, not to the release
193
According to this reasoning, only a
of hazardous substances.
volunteer can incur response costs. Thus, if the Atlantic Research
Court agreed with this interpretation, it would not have any question
about the overlap case. The forced remediator would not have a §
107 claim.
The difference between the courts regarding the importance of
being a “volunteer” can also be seen in their policy discussions. The
Con Ed court quoted extensively from statements in the legislative

188. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000).
189. See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338.
190. See Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that to
recover response costs, the party who performed remediation need not have acted pursuant to a
court order or judgment).
191. See id. at 99 (finding that Con Ed incurred response costs when remediating the plant
sites).
192. See id. (adding that the costs Con Ed incurred were not a result of an order or
judgment).
193. See id. at 100.
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history of CERCLA about the importance of being a volunteer.194
The Atlantic Research decision contains none of that policy discussion
and does not cite to that discussion in Con Ed. The Atlantic Research
Court, by not discussing the importance of being a volunteer, shows a
greater understanding of the practical realities because it recognizes
that, to a large extent, there are no volunteers. There are very few
parties who will spend significant sums of money to clean up someone
else’s mess without any compensation.195 Aviall, Con Ed, and Atlantic
Research were all threatened with enforcement actions and
“volunteered” rather than engaging in litigation that they could not
win. They were, therefore, not responding to the release of
hazardous substances as much as they were responding to the threat
of enforcement actions.
If the Con Ed “volunteer” was not responding to the release, but
was, instead, responding to the potential liability, then the Con Ed
court’s reasoning, based on what the person is responding to, does not
fit the realities of the case. The volunteer in Aviall, and accordingly,
196
in § 113(f)(1), is a person who has not been subject to a civil action.
The Con Ed volunteer, on the other hand, is responding to the release
of hazardous substances because he is not responding to a civil
action.197
The Atlantic Research Court rejected that reasoning. It accepted
the Aviall definition of volunteer for the purposes of § 113. That
definition, however, does not transplant to § 107(a)(4)(B) because, as
a practical matter, that person is responding to the threat of liability
and not to the release of a hazardous substance, and § 107(a)(4)(B)
provides a cause of action for the person who incurred response costs
(i.e., the remediator) without any indication that the person’s
198
motivation is relevant.
The Atlantic Research Court made clear that it believed that
there are no true volunteers when it stated that “if PRPs do not

194. See id. at 94 (stating that the goals of CERCLA are to impose liability on responsible
parties “and inducing those persons ‘voluntarily to pursue appropriate environmental response
actions’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016(I), at 17 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6120)).
195. See Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d 188, 200 (2d Cir. 2006) (pointing out the
disincentive of undertaking a voluntary cleanup without compensation).
196. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 168 (2004) (“Aviall has
never been subject to [a civil] action.”).
197. See Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 94.
198. See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2338 (2007) (giving no regard
to a party’s motivation).
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qualify as ‘any other person’ for purposes of § 107(a)(4)(B), it is
unclear what private party would. . . . [A]ccepting the Government’s
interpretation would reduce the number of potential plaintiffs to
almost zero . . . .”199
The government’s interpretation of §
107(a)(4)(B) was dependent on the existence of true volunteers,200
non-PRPs who remediate a site and seek contribution. The Atlantic
Research Court took the position that either such people do not exist
or there are so few of them that their presence is not sufficient to
201
warrant recognition in interpreting the statute.
Thus, while the Con Ed court believed that it was important to
202
the Atlantic Research Court
encourage voluntary cleanup,
recognized that in reality there are no true volunteers and those who
the Con Ed court viewed as volunteers do not need a cause of action
against other PRPs as an economic incentive to remediate because
the potential liability faced by such PRPs already gives them
sufficient incentive to remediate.
From a policy perspective, the Atlantic Research Court’s
distinction between reimbursers and remediators upholds a position
that EPA had been trumpeting. The government’s brief in Atlantic
Research argued that CERCLA was never intended to promote
“wholly voluntary, unsupervised, sua sponte” cleanups.203 The goal,
according to the government, is to promote “government-supervised
cleanups and [to encourage] PRPs promptly to settle their liability
with the government.”204 Indeed, the government is critical of the
Con Ed court’s discussion of encouraging voluntary cleanups because
Congress did not intend “to promote unsupervised cleanups at the
expense of government-supervised cleanups.”205

199. Id. at 2336.
200. Id. at 2336–37. The Court noted that Congress had exempted some bona fide
purchasers and the government claimed that these parties could be innocent plaintiffs. Id.
However, even if the exemption did create some potential plaintiffs, the government’s
interpretation of the statute required one to accept the proposition that a statute enacted in
1980 was meaningless until the passage of an exemption in 2002. Id. at 2337.
201. See id. at 2336 (“[I]f PRPs do not qualify as “any other person” for purposes of §
107(a)(4)(B), it is unclear what private party would.”).
202. See Consol. Edison, 334 F.3d at 94, 100 (“[W]e would be impermissibly discouraging
voluntary cleanup were we to read section 107(a) to preclude parties that, if sued, would be held
liable . . . from recovering necessary response costs.”).
203. Brief for the United States at 39–43, Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. 2331 (No. 06-562), 2007
WL 669263.
204. Id. at 36.
205. Id. at 13, 39 (emphasis omitted). The government interprets all of the references to
encouraging voluntary cleanups in CERCLA’s legislative history to mean by settlement with the
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The Atlantic Research Court seems to have accepted the
government’s position by adopting a distinction between remediators
and reimbursers that leaves no room in the Court’s plain reading of
the statute for the volunteer. That is, § 107(a) contains advantages
not provided by § 113. Once it is given that some PRPs are to have
these advantages and others are not, the Court needed to explain
which PRPs are to have those advantages—volunteers or all
remediators. The Court’s explanation of § 107(a)(4)(B) indicated
that the statute gave those advantages to all remediators.
Two additional CERCLA provisions provide support for the
Atlantic Research Court’s interpretation of § 107(a)(4)(B)—the
statute of limitations triggers and the National Contingency Plan
(NCP) requirement. The statute of limitations for a § 107 claim is “3
206
years after completion of the removal action” or “6 years after
initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action.”207
In both cases, the statute of limitations is triggered by remedial
activity, not by reimbursing someone. The statute of limitations for a
§ 113 contribution claim is “3 years after—(A) the date of
judgment . . . or (B) the date of an administrative order . . . or entry of
a judicially approved settlement with respect to such costs or
damages.”208
The trigger is a judgment or settlement, not
remediation. This fits in well with the Court’s distinction between the
remediator who has a § 107(a) cause of action and the reimburser
who has a § 113 claim. It also supports the conclusion that being a
volunteer is relevant to whether one has a § 113 claim (because the
statute of limitations is only triggered if one reimburses as a result of
litigation or settlement, thus excluding the volunteer), but it is not
relevant to the § 107(a) claim because the statute of limitations is
triggered by remediation without regard to why one remediated.
The different statute of limitations triggers also help explain why
the overlap case should provide a cause of action under both
provisions. For the non-volunteer remediator, there has been
litigation or a settlement triggering a § 113(f)(1) claim, and the non-

government “rather than a wholly voluntary, unsupervised, sua sponte cleanup.” Id. at 41
(quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 537 (2006), abrogated
by Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. 2331).
206. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(A) (2000).
207. Id. § 9613(g)(2)(B).
208. Id. § 9613(g)(3).
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volunteer remediator has also performed remedial activity that
triggers a § 107 claim.
The Court could have also used the NCP requirement to support
its conclusion that the key to identifying who may sue under § 107 is
the performance of remediation. In both §§ 107(a)(4)(A) and (B),
response costs are recoverable only if they are incurred in a manner
that “is consistent with” (or “not inconsistent with”) the NCP.209 The
NCP is EPA’s codification of “procedures and standards for
responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and
contaminants.”210 The only costs that it makes any sense to refer to as
consistent with the NCP are remediation costs. Therefore, only
remediation costs are recoverable under § 107(a)(4)(B), and
conversely, anyone who merely reimburses another party has not
incurred costs in a manner that is consistent with the NCP and has no
claim under § 107.
D. Contribution, Joint Tortfeasor Status, and Joint and Several
Liability
The Court’s uncertainty regarding the overlap case could also
relate to uncertainty regarding whether a PRP who has a § 107(a)
claim is entitled to joint and several liability. The Court stated that it
assumes, without deciding, that a § 107(a) plaintiff is entitled to joint
and several liability.211 However, in the overlap case, where the
forced remediator has a cause of action under both provisions and
there is a contribution counterclaim, the Court was uncertain whether
the contribution counterclaim would turn everything into a
contribution claim in which each party pays its fair share, or whether
the § 107(a) claim with joint and several liability would still provide
some advantage for the remediator.
Let’s examine a simple example. Assume there are four parties,
each of whom contributed equal quantities of the same waste to the
site. Equitable apportionment is likely to assign twenty-five percent
shares to each party. However, where one party has remediated the
site and therefore has a § 107(a) claim, that party may be entitled to

209. Id. § 9607(a). A difference between subsections (a)(4)(A) and (a)(4)(B) is that in
(a)(4)(A), the government may collect costs that are incurred in a manner that is “not
inconsistent with” the NCP, while in (a)(4)(B), the private party can collect only if the costs are
incurred in a manner that is “consistent with” the NCP. Id.
210. Id. § 9605(a).
211. United States v. Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 n.7 (2007) (“We assume without
deciding that § 107(a) provides for joint and several liability.”).
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joint and several liability, in which case the other three parties would
all pay one-third and the remediator will recover all of its costs.
A number of courts have suggested that it is unfair to permit a
PRP to recover all of its costs. The PRP is, after all, responsible for
part of the problem. For example, in Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United
States,212 the court addressed the issue of whether a PRP who has a
cause of action under § 107(a) should be able to collect all of its
213
costs. The court concluded, based on Atlantic Research, that a PRP
who is a § 107(a) plaintiff should be entitled to joint and several
liability.214 The court then addressed the contribution counterclaim.
The court reasoned that such a counterclaim is not precluded and a
court may apply equitable considerations to impose some burden on
the plaintiff.215 A New York court reached the same conclusion in In
216
Re Dana Corp.
Why does the contribution counterclaim not defeat joint and
several liability? That is, in the above example, the contribution
counterclaim could impose twenty-five percent of the costs on the
plaintiff and the plaintiff could be left with none of the benefits of
joint and several liability. The answer is twofold. First, the effect of
the counterclaim requires the application of equitable factors and a
court of equity could treat the twenty-five percent contributor who
remediated better than it treats the twenty-five percent contributor
who did not remediate. The Atlantic Research Court’s reasoning
suggests that it should. Second, and more importantly, is the orphan
217
Most
share that is present in almost every Superfund case.
Superfund sites contain contamination that occurred many years
ago.218 There are usually contributors to the contamination who are
not before the court because they could not be located or they are out

212. Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (D. Kan. 2007).
213. See id. at 1307–08 (highlighting the two issues concerning claims for cost recovery and
contribution).
214. See id. at 1309–13.
215. See id. at 1313–14.
216. In re Dana Corp., 379 B.R. 449, 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
217. See Thomas W. Church & Robert T. Nakamura, Beyond Superfund: Hazardous Waste
Cleanup in Europe and the United States, 7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 15, 26 (1994) (noting the
issues typically raised in Superfund cases).
218. See Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury,
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1480 (2005) (suggesting the need to use forensic techniques and models
to estimate “the origin and timing of contaminated release”).
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of business.219 When the other PRPs are subject to joint and several
liability, they are forced to pay this orphan share.
Thus, if we take the above case where there are only four PRPs,
if only three are before the Court, the remediator PRP that has joint
and several liability can shift the entire orphan share to the two
defendants. A fair result could thus have the plaintiff paying
approximately twenty-five percent based on its equitable share and
the other two PRPs sharing the other seventy-five percent. The
courts in Raytheon and Dana concluded that permitting the PRP
plaintiff to recover all of its costs and making the defendants pay
100% is unfair.220 However, by holding that such parties are entitled
to joint and several liability, the courts have also concluded that not
providing an advantage for the remediator is inconsistent with
Atlantic Research.
The Atlantic Research Court may have left this issue open
because there are cases where the application of joint and several
liability may be unfair. For example, what if there is a very large
orphan share? Let’s say there are nine contributing parties, eight of
whom each contributed 10% of the contamination and one of whom
contributed 20%. The 20% contributor remediates and sues the only
PRP he can locate. Should a 10% contributor be stuck with 80% or
100% of the costs when a party who caused more of the problem pays
significantly less? The Atlantic Research Court did not decide this
issue. If we say that such a plaintiff has only a § 113 claim, the parties
are on equal footing. On the other hand, if the plaintiff has a § 107
claim and is entitled joint and several liability, the said plaintiff should
not be required to pay any of the orphan share.
The Atlantic Research Court left open the possibilities that (1)
joint and several liability would preclude the contribution
counterclaim, permitting 100% recovery; or (2) the contribution
counterclaim would wipe out joint and several liability. The approach
suggested by the Raytheon and Dana courts, in which both joint and
several liability and the contribution counterclaim have a role, seems
to be fairer than either extreme.

219. See Amy B. Blumenberg, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future
Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 670 (1992)
(stating that the parties that are no longer in business and engaged in hazardous dumping may
be out of the courts’ reach).
220. See Raytheon Aircraft, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 1310–11 (noticing the potential for PRP
plaintiffs to fully recover their costs); In re Dana, 379 B.R. at 459.
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What if there is no Joint and Several Liability?
To the extent that the Atlantic Research Court questioned
whether a PRP plaintiff should have joint and several liability, it
permits the expansion of a divisibility argument that has been
rejected by most courts deciding Superfund actions. The Superfund
Law makes no reference to joint and several liability. Indeed, both
the House and Senate versions of the bill that became the Superfund
Law contained language authorizing joint and several liability which
221
Nevertheless, courts have
was removed shortly before passage.
consistently applied joint and several liability. One of the earliest
decisions to apply joint and several liability in a Superfund action was
222
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.
The court reasoned that the
removal of the joint and several language from the bill was not a
rejection of joint and several liability, but was merely intended to
provide courts with flexibility in determining whether to apply joint
and several liability.223 The court further reasoned that where a
mixture of chemicals creates one problem, it is difficult to determine
what part of the problem is attributable to what part of the
combination.224 Therefore, joint and several liability is appropriate.
Courts have generally applied joint and several liability in
Superfund actions based on the common law of joint tortfeasors. 225

221. The Senate amendments eliminating joint and several liability were passed on
November 24, 1980. 126 CONG. REC. 30,987 (1980). The House amendments eliminating joint
and several liability were passed on December 3, 1980. Id. at 31,981. These amendments are
discussed by the Chem-Dyne court, quoting extensively from Senator Helms’ speech. United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 806 (S.D. Ohio 1983). Senator Helms explained
the deletion of joint and several liability as follows: “Retention of joint and several liability in S.
1480 received intense and well deserved criticism.” 126 CONG. REC. 30,972.
222. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802.
223. Id. at 808. To determine whether joint and several liability should be applied, the
Chem-Dyne court relied on statements in the legislative history that indicate congressional
intent to rely on common law principles. Id. at 806–07 (quoting Senator Randolph: “[W]e have
deleted any reference to joint and several liability, relying on common law principles to
determine when parties should be severally liable,” and Representative Florio: “Issues of joint
and several liability not resolved by this [amendment] shall be governed by . . . common law”).
224. Id. at 811.
225. Among the early Superfund decisions that analyze the meaning of the statute’s failure
to address whether liability is joint and several are Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp 1484,
1486 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v. Argent Corp., Civ No. 83-0523 BB, 1984 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16976, at *3–4 (D.N.M. May 4, 1984); and Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 806. One
commentator summed up a section on joint and several liability by stating that “in a very short
period of time, so many courts had adopted the Chem-Dyne position [holding that Superfund
defendants are jointly and severally liable] that there was no longer a reasonable basis for
disagreement concerning the application of joint and several liability.” TOPOL & SNOW, supra
note 11, § 4:11 (citing United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo.
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Numerous courts have used § 433A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts to determine when to apply joint and several liability and when
226
liability is divisible. The comments to the Restatement indicate that
joint and several liability is appropriate where the actions causing the
harm interact so that there is one harm that results from the
combination of the events and each cause is necessary, but not
sufficient, to cause the result.227 On the other hand, when the harms
occur in sequence, each adding to the cumulative effect of the other,
then the causes do not interact; each cause is sufficient to cause the
problem or some identifiable part of the problem and joint and
several liability is not appropriate.
A definition of joint tortfeasor that depends on the interaction of
the acts of the defendants does not explain why many PRPs have joint
and several liability. How can an owner and one who contaminated
the site be jointly and severally liable? Their actions did not interact,
particularly if the owner purchased after the contamination. They are
not joint tortfeasors as that term is used in the common law.
Similarly, parties who sent waste to a landfill that is a Superfund site
and the remedy is to simply place a cap over the contamination, may
be another example of where the resulting problem is not caused by
interaction. In that case, there are so many contributors that none is
necessary to the result. Does the Atlantic Research decision, by
questioning the applicability of joint and several liability, open the
door to more divisibility claims?
Superfund defendants often raise the issue of divisibility, but
courts have found Superfund liability to be divisible only in very
limited circumstances. An example is In re Bell Petroleum Services,228
where a single environmental harm was caused by operators of the
same plating facility, each of whom operated the facility for a
different number of years.229 The court found that they were not joint

1984) (citing five other federal decisions for the proposition that there was no ground for
difference of opinion on the issue)).
226. See, e.g., In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268–70 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Monsanto Co.,
858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988); Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811; see also Aaron
Gershonowitz, Joint and Several Liability in Superfund Actions: When is Environmental Harm
Divisible? PRPs Who Want to be Cows, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 207, 209–30 (2003)
(describing how courts have applied § 433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to CERCLA
cases).
227. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. d (1965) (discussing divisibility).
228. In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889.
229. Id. at 892.
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tortfeasors because there was a means of dividing the results of their
actions, and held that each should be liable for a portion of the costs
230
based on a “volumetric basis.”
The Atlantic Research Court’s reasoning, which suggests that a
231
PRP plaintiff and other PRPs may not be joint tortfeasors, could
provide a broader role for divisibility. The Court stated that
“contribution . . . is contingent upon an inequitable distribution of
common liability among liable parties. By contrast, § 107(a) permits
recovery of cleanup costs but does not create a right to contribution.
A private party may recover under § 107(a) without any
establishment of liability to a third party.”232 If PRPs are not
necessarily joint tortfeasors, that is, they do not have common
liability, then what is the basis for joint and several liability?
Certainly, the PRP plaintiff will not be jointly and severally liable on
the contribution counterclaim. However, if the contribution of two
PRPs who sent waste to the site is divisible based on one being a
remediator and one being a reimburser, then other PRPs whose
relationship to the contamination is categorically different may also
be able to avoid joint and several liability. The Atlantic Research
Court’s reasoning thus suggests a broader use of divisibility.
E. Contribution Protection
The Atlantic Research Court noted that granting a PRP a §
107(a) claim may interfere with the contribution protection provisions
of CERCLA that are designed to encourage settlement. The Court
acknowledged the problem, but took the position that even if PRPs
can be § 107(a) plaintiffs and can thus have a cause of action against
those who settled (i.e., a claim against those who have contribution
233
In
protection), the incentive to settle would not be undermined.
other words, the Court concluded that some PRPs could have a cause
of action against a PRP who has contribution protection, but that is
not a significant concern.
The Court must have known that some courts had used the
CERCLA contribution protection provision to defeat claims other
than contribution claims. For example, in United States v. Cannons

230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 904.
See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2338 (2007).
Id. at 2339.
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Engineering Corp.,234 the court dismissed common law indemnity
claims because they were seen as an attempt “to make an end run
235
around the statutory scheme.” Nevertheless, the Atlantic Research
Court did not express a concern about any “end runs” around the
statutory scheme and took the position that a § 107(a)(4)(B) claim
would not be prevented.236
What About the Governmental Entity that Reimburses
Another?
Is a government entity that reimburses another government
entity for remediation costs entitled to joint and several liability?
This is, in a sense, the reverse of the overlap case the Court was
concerned with. The overlap case described by the Court was the
person who performs remediation as a result of litigation. This
person is not a volunteer and therefore has a § 113 contribution claim,
but has also performed remediation, and therefore should have a §
107 claim. The reverse case, the nonremediator that is a volunteer,
may not have a claim under either section because it has clearly not
“incurred” response costs to have a § 107 claim and, as a volunteer,
does not have a contribution claim.
An example of such a case is Town of Windsor v. Tesa Tuck,
237
The Town of Windsor remediated a Superfund site and the
Inc.
State of New York reimbursed the Town for a portion of its costs
pursuant to the New York State Environmental Quality Bond Act.238
The Town and the State brought a § 107(a) action against responsible
parties and some of the parties moved to dismiss the State’s claim
because the State, as a reimburser, did not incur response costs.239
The court concluded that the costs of reimbursing the Town for its
240
response costs were response costs.
Under Atlantic Research, that issue would be decided differently.
The Atlantic Research Court concluded that only one who performs
the remediation has “incurred” response costs. The State did not
perform remediation and therefore should not be able to bring a §
107(a) claim.

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

United States v. Cannons Eng’r. Corp., 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990).
Id. at 92.
See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2339.
Town of Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Id. at 319.
Id. at 319–20.
Id. at 320.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court began reexamining who may be a Superfund
plaintiff in Aviall, holding that a PRP who voluntarily performs
remediation does not have a § 113 claim for contribution against the
person who caused the contamination.241 The Court left open the
possibility that such a person may have a § 107 claim.
The limitation on who could bring a § 113 claim caused a
reexamination of who may bring a § 107 claim, resulting in the
Atlantic Research decision, which held that a volunteer who
remediated the site could be a § 107 plaintiff.242 In order to explain
how the two sections fit together, the Court addressed the different
roles the two sections play in the statutory scheme. The result is that,
now, a potentially responsible party who remediates a site and
thereby incurs response costs has rights that are substantially
different from the potentially responsible party who merely
reimburses someone else for response costs. This result raises a
question about whether such a party would be subject to joint and
several liability, and this article explained how the Court’s reasoning
could lead to a reassessment of joint and several liability in Superfund
litigation.
The Court also acknowledged, and left open, the question of
whether the non-volunteer who remediates should be treated like a
volunteer who remediates. This article has concluded that the two
should be treated the same with respect to having a § 107(a)(4)(B)
claim. Additionally, this article suggested a procedure for dealing
with the complicated cases in which a PRP who is a § 107(a)(4)(B)
plaintiff is entitled to joint and several liability and faces contribution
counterclaims.

241. See supra notes 32–48 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 49–82 and accompanying text.

